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When coming to the text Integral Ecology, one encounters the articulation of 
a new paradigm for ecology postulated by Sean Esbjörn-Hargens and Michael E. 
Zimmerman based upon the underlying ideas of Ken Wilber. Articulating any 
paradigm requires five central delimitations to be met.1 The first is the 
underlying logic of the paradigm, whereby a paradigm’s arguments have both 
order and sequence and are derived through inductive and/or deductive means.
2 Secondly, the paradigm’s epistemology must be defined, including a specific 
examination of how the paradigm defines how and what can be known and not 
known3, as well as the relationship between the knower and the researcher, 
whom Ponterotto terms the “would-be knower”4. Thirdly, the paradigm must 
have an articulated axiology, whereby the values around which the paradigm’s 
inquiry or application revolve5 or what is “worth understanding and 
transforming”6. Fourth, ontology, “the ultimate nature and relations of being”7 
and “abstractions that define a thing to be what it is”8 or simply put the nature 
of reality9 must be defined. And fifth to be articulated is the paradigm’s 
methodology or the techniques believed to best elucidate the phenomena to be 
studied and that are informed by the previous criteria.10 I would add a sixth 
category of paradigmatic definition when examining this text of its 
cosmological positions, defined as how this new view of ecology accounts for 
the origins of the reality it seeks to know.11 Through a paradigmatic analysis of 
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this text we have a way of specifically elucidating the positions, values, beliefs 
and assumptions of the text that seeks to encourage, and rightly so, the need 
for taking multiple perspectives into consideration when addressing the 
complex human and non-human and landscape relationships.
At the level of logic, Integral Ecology is presented as a tried-and-tested 
theory.12 The very term “theory” implies, despite the authors’ resistance to 
empiricism, that it will unfold a largely substantiated collection of research and 
a general consensus from a number of expert individuals. It does not. While the 
text is organized in such a way as to orient the reader to Wilberian thought, we 
never quite move from this position. When references are required to 
substantiate an assertion of truth they are either: (a) entirely absent, such as 
when the authors assert “even though different lines develop at different rates, 
we can speak abstract of an overall center of gravity. For instance a 2-year-old 
will have a very different emotional and moral capacity than an 18-year-old or a 
56-year-old”13; or (b) they are sparsely utilized and frequently framed through 
how Wilber previously utilized them, which Adams has described as being a 
“non-representative use of sources” and counterarguments.14 Indeed, the only 
supporting “evidence” they can ultimately produce are three studies which fail 
to: (a) meet the fundamental condition of the very theory they utilize 
(interiority; all rely on applying the multi-perspective framework to humans 
only and relying strictly upon a more traditional definition of ecology and 
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empiricism for elucidation of the environmental impacts; thereby excluding the 
possibility of interiority of the actual non-human others involved in the study); 
and (b) produce any discussion on why they opted to utilize Wilber’s 
framework. Indeed, Riddell’s research went so far as to lack critical self-
reflection as to why her mode of intervention did not produce the desired and 
recommended scope of protected land.15 We are further left in a logical 
quagmire when attempting to discern how the authors and Wilber determined 
what ecology is. Relying largely on one researcher’s book, they determine that 
ecology is not defined and therefore they feel free to define it in such a way as 
to conflate and subsequently obscure any discipline, philosophy, religion or 
modern movement that has co-opted the term ecology or the “eco-” prefix with 
the underlying justification that they are creating a meta-framework.16 In short, 
their text, while organized, comes across to this reader as logically incoherent.
There are two epistemological issues that emerge within this text that are 
worth examination, one  which I do believe raises a positive epistemological 
direction; the other a bright yellow-caution sign. What this book does do, and 
does it well—if not somewhat overly complexly, is emphasize a way of knowing 
the world that stresses both objective and subjective, exterior and interior 
perspectives. Drawing upon empiricism and phenomenological (as examples) 
philosophical traditions, the writers and Wilber by extension have touched on 
something that is only trickling into modern science and not yet in modern 
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scientific ecology.17 The closest and largely comparable evidence of the 
deliberate merging of these states is in the growing use of mix-methods, which 
can be grounded within a mixture of philosophical traditions that support both 
quantitative (and thus empiricist) and qualitative (and thus phenomenological, 
for example) modes. While the underlying logic and over-arching aspects to the 
authors’ interior/exterior perspectives is problematic, the emphasis on 
adopting this mixed way of knowing the world is beneficial—this 
epistemological position is well elucidated in their discussion encouraging a 
broadening of accepted research methodological systems. However, the 
cautionary epistemological issue is the underlying assumption that integral 
ecology, indeed the over-arching integral movement, can ultimately know 
everything, being limited only by: the actual individuals’ developmental stages, 
narrow or lower-level developed perspectives, or simply shallow frameworks. In 
this we have an epistemological confirmation that the only limitation to 
knowledge is one’s self and whether one lives in a “Constitutional democracy,” 
which is a developed framework that serves to “create circumstances for 
interior development”.18 This also speaks to an underlying axiology, where the 
individual “I” is a pinnacle value as are humans in general (something I will 
return to shortly). I personally agree with this notion, but then I live in the 
United States, and like many holding European–Western values, I pride myself 
on individualism.19 This is my personal ethnocentric bias, not an ontological 
argument. Yet, while the authors decry the literally nameless multicultural 
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critics, who argue against hierarchical models20, they ultimately display their 
own ethnocentrism (not worldcentrism) quite clearly. Adams specifically 
critiqued this developmental model, writing that: the ultimate  stage of 
consciousness (and thus the penultimate stage of development achievable only 
by humans) of a complete and full understanding of the kosmos, was a logical 
fallacy.
Non-dualism can only represent the highest form of religious awareness, 
if there is no reality outside of or in addition to the non-dual Kosmos; 
Wilber cannot confirm the non-existence of such a reality beyond the 
non-dual Kosmos, and therefore, at best, he should confine himself to 
the position of a non-dual agnostic, taking no position regarding the 
existence or non-existence of a reality or Being to which he does not 
have access through any level of the spectrum of consciousness.21
Adams’ quote ultimately introduces two other elements of the integral ecology 
paradigm that are examined: ontology and cosmology.
Ontologically, Integral Ecology adheres to Wilber’s view of  reality, known as 
the Kosmos. The nature of this penultimate reality is one of ever-increasing 
complexity and transcendence and inclusion; whereby human beings are the 
pinnacle species. They assert that “many agree that cosmic history and 
terrestrial history have evolved in ways consistent with how they are depicted in 
these four developmental quandrants”22; but no cosmologist is listed. Thus the 
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ontological foundation of Integral Ecology is assumed to be real and largely 
universal. We find this ontological argument also extends into the veiled 
cosmological argument, whereby the direction of development is a reflection of 
a built-in purpose of existence. When we combine the ontological and 
cosmological platform together, we can infer the authors hold that human 
beings are the center of that emerging universe: “we maintain that humans are 
special, in part because humans are endowed with an interior depth that allows 
us to appreciate the value of nature!” and “only humans can have an ecological 
realization of ‘oneness’ with nature”.23 How they have come to assert no other 
species is capable of this level of consciousness when we have no mode of 
assessing the interiorities of other species is a question this reviewer is left 
asking. However, these grand assertions merely reflect the underlying 
ontological and cosmological positions. This brings me to my concluding 
comments about the underlying paradigm and revolving around its axiology, 
the underlying values purported by this text.
Situating human beings as a pinnacle species is an axiological position; there 
is no current scientific evidence to my knowledge.Indeed, Richard Dawkins, a 
preeminent evolutionary biologist, has argued directly to the opposite that such 
a belief reflects a fundamental anthropocentrism.24 Yet, the authors engage in a 
curious bait-and-switch with this value. They make two arguments, first the  
claim that environmentalists who hold a web-of-life view25 both ignore the 
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interiority of Nature (that is a fundamental understanding of reality as 
symbolized by the capital “N” according to the authors—thus environmentalist 
ignore the ontological views of the authors, meaning they ignore the natural 
development of life and the pinnacle status of humans) and are 
anthropocentric. I am still unclear how that logic unfolds. If environmentalists 
by and large ignore the ontological arguments of the authors, they simply 
cannot be assumed as anthropocentric (although some are from an axiological 
perspective, whereby environmental action is linked to the preservation of 
human life). Indeed, they write: 
Wilber sympathizes with the motives of environmentalists who attempt to 
overcome anthropocentrism by diminishing differences between humans 
and other organisms and proclaiming that everything is part of nature. 
This assertion ignores the difficult problem of defining ‘nature,’ and 
denies what differentiates humans form other organisms.26 
While patronizing environmentalists, the authors themselves never move 
beyond anthropomorphizing—indeed the entire ontological and cosmological 
platform rests on the value of the human mind. Environmentalists, who see the 
shared biological history and reliance upon a fragile living world as we know it, 
can hardly be viewed as fundamentally anthropomorphic. The second way the 
underlying axiology of the authors emerges is one that not only continues the 
anthropomorphic vision, but also refines this to reiterate an ethnocentric bias 
that I discussed earlier. The authors outright reject any moral “ought” is 
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involved within the environmental debate, claiming that environmentalists are 
“confused”.27 Even further, these web-of-lifers are not simply ignorant and 
befuddled anthropocentrists, but outright fascists. Twice in the text the authors 
resort to Wilberian polemics; going so far as to conclude their text with a fear-
mongering warning against the dangerous environmentalists. The reader of 
Integral Ecology must accept the tenets of this text precisely to guard against 
being an ecofascist. Playing on the ethnocentric fear of United States cold-war 
political rhetoric, the authors write: 
survival of the social collective…requires that individual sacrifice 
themselves and their interests to the good of the superorganisms…. All 
too often environmentalists assign intrinsic value solely to the web of life, 
thereby concluding that the parts of the web (individual life forms) either 
lack value of their own or at best have equal value. Such an approach 
provides no criteria for making difficult moral decisions. Moreover, this 
approach indicates that if individual humans or classes of humans are 
harming the web of life, then other humans (who shall they be?) should 
prevent such behavior at whatever cost. This is ecofascism”.28
Ecofeminist, Val Plumwood has suggested that there may very well be 
decisions down the line that infringe upon Eurocentric values of individualism.29 
I personally would rather make sacrifices now than have to live in a world where 
only a chosen few ultimately survive because we degraded our environment to 
the point where it is bankrupt of sustainability. Are environmentalists 
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fundamentally short-sighted and infringing upon personal freedom by stating 
we simply cannot have what we want and that our lifestyles are incompatible 
with life on earth? Or extremists for asserting that the human species is 
problematic to other species and ourselves?  I personally find this polemical 
injection a telling one, highlighting the authors in-group identity status as 
insulated within the worldview of Kenneth Wilber. The text reads, in the words 
of Ken Wilber himself, as being an “emotionally prejudiced and self-
contradictory…polemic disguised as reason…[it is] pseudologic, pseudoscience, 
and dogmatic absolutism.”30 And I am still trying to determine what color my 
consciousness is—it must not be very high up on the Wilberian totem pole.
References
Adams, G. 2002. “A Theistic Perspective on Ken Wilber’s Transpersonal 
Psychology.” Journal of Contemporary Religion, 17(2): 165–179. 
Brennan, James F. 2003. History and Systems of Psychology (6th Ed.). Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Dawkins, Richard. 2004. The Ancestor’s Tale: A Pilgrimage to the Dawn of 
Evolution. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Esbjörn-Hargens, Sean & Zimmerman, Michael E. 2009. Integral Ecology: Using 
Multiple Perspectives on the Natural World. Boston, MA: Shambhala 
Publications, Inc. 
182
Giordano, Joe & McGoldrick, Monica. 1996. “European Families: An Overview.” 
In Monica McGoldrick, Joe Giordano, & John K. Pearce (eds.), Ethnicity and 
Family Therapy (2nd Ed.). Chapter 29, p. 427–441. New York: The Guilford Press.
Molles, Manuel C. 2005. Ecology: Concepts and Applications. Boston, MA: The 
McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.
Naess, Arne. 1989. Ecology, Community and Lifestyle (D. Rothenberg, Trans.). 
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 
1976).
Ortega, L. 2005. “Methodology, Epistemology, and Ethics in Instructed SLA 
Research: An Introduction.” Modern Language Journal, 89: 317–327
Perry, John & Bratman, Michael. 1999. Introduction to Philosophy: Classical & 
Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Plumwood, Val. 2002. Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason. 
New York: Routledge. 
Ponterotto, J. G. 2005. “Qualitative Research in Counseling Psychology: A Primer 
on Research Paradigms and Philosophy of Science.” Journal of Counseling 
Psychology 52:126–136.
Riddle, Darcy. 2009. “Evolving Approaches to Conservation: Integral Ecology 
and Canada’s Great Bear Rainforest” In Sean Esbjörn-Hargens and Michael E. 
Zimmerman (eds.), Integral Ecology: Using Multiple Perspectives on the Natural 
World. Case Study III, p. 454–475. Boston, MA: Shambhala Publications, Inc.
183
Tashakkorie, Abbas & Teddlie, Charles B. 1998. Mixed Methodology: Combining 
Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, Inc. 
Wilber, Ken. 1989. “Let’s Nuke the Transpersonalists: A Response to Albert 
Ellis.” Journal of Counseling & Development, 67(6): 332–335.
Zalasiewicz, Jan, Williams, Mark, Steffen, Will, & Paul, Crutzen. 2010. “The New 
World of the Anthropocene.” Environmental Science & Technology, XXX: A–D.
Endnotes
1. Tashakkorie, Abbas & Teddlie, Charles B. 1998. Mixed Methodology: 
Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, Inc. 
2. Brennan, James F. 2003. History and Systems of Psychology (6th Ed.). Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
3. Perry, John & Bratman, Michael. 1999. Introduction to Philosophy: Classical & 
Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. See also 
Ponterotto, J. G. 2005. “Qualitative Research in Counseling Psychology: A Primer 
on Research Paradigms and Philosophy of Science.” Journal of Counseling 
Psychology 52:126–136. 
4. Ponterotto, J. G. 2005. “Qualitative Research in Counseling Psychology: A 
Primer on Research Paradigms and Philosophy of Science.” Journal of 
Counseling Psychology 52:126–136. p. 127.
184
5. Naess, Arne. 1989. Ecology, Community and Lifestyle (D. Rothenberg, 
Trans.). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. (Original work 
published 1976). See also Tashakkorie, Abbas & Teddlie, Charles B. 1998. 
Mixed Methodology: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 
6. Ortega, L. 2005. “Methodology, Epistemology, and Ethics in Instructed SLA 
Research: An Introduction.” Modern Language Journal, 89: 317–327. p. 317.  
7. Brennan, James F. 2003. History and Systems of Psychology (6th Ed.). Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. p. 346.
8. Brennan, James F. 2003. History and Systems of Psychology (6th Ed.). Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.p. 346.
9. Tashakkorie, Abbas & Teddlie, Charles B. 1998. Mixed Methodology: 
Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, Inc.
10. Ponterotto, J. G. 2005. “Qualitative Research in Counseling Psychology: A 
Primer on Research Paradigms and Philosophy of Science.”  Journal of 
Counseling Psychology 52:126–136. p. 127. See also Tashakkorie, Abbas & 
Teddlie, Charles B. 1998. Mixed Methodology: Combining Qualitative and 
Quantitative Approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
11. Ponterotto, J. G. 2005. “Qualitative Research in Counseling Psychology: A 
Primer on Research Paradigms and Philosophy of Science”. Journal of 
Counseling Psychology 52:126–136. p. 127.
185
12. Esbjörn-Hargens, Sean & Zimmerman, Michael E.2009. Integral Ecology: 
Using Multiple Perspectives on the Natural World. Boston, MA: Shambhala 
Publications, Inc. p. 8.
13. Esbjörn-Hargens, Sean & Zimmerman, Michael E. 2009. Integral Ecology: 
Using Multiple Perspectives on the Natural World. Boston, MA: Shambhala 
Publications, Inc. p. 125
14. Adams, G. 2002. “A Theistic Perspective on Ken Wilber’s Transpersonal 
Psychology.” Journal of Contemporary Religion, 17(2): 165–179. p. 178.
15. Riddle, Darcy. 2009. “Evolving Approaches to Conservation: Integral Ecology 
and Canada’s Great Bear Rainforest” In Sean Esbjörn-Hargens and Michael E. 
Zimmerman (eds.), Integral Ecology: Using Multiple Perspectives on the Natural 
World. Case Study III, p. 454–475. Boston, MA: Shambhala Publications, Inc.
16. Esbjörn-Hargens, Sean & Zimmerman, Michael E. 2009. Integral Ecology: 
Using Multiple Perspectives on the Natural World. Boston, MA: Shambhala 
Publications, Inc. See chapter 5.
17. see Molles, Manuel C. 2005. Ecology: Concepts and Applications. Boston, 
MA: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.
18. Esbjörn-Hargens, Sean & Zimmerman, Michael E. 2009. Integral Ecology: 
Using Multiple Perspectives on the Natural World. Boston, MA: Shambhala 
Publications, Inc. p. 153.
19. Giordano, Joe & McGoldrick, Monica. 1996. “European Families: An 
Overview.” In Monica McGoldrick, Joe Giordano, & John K. Pearce (eds.), 
186
Ethnicity and Family Therapy (2nd Ed.). Chapter 29, p. 427–441. New York: The 
Guilford Press.
20. Esbjörn-Hargens, Sean & Zimmerman, Michael E. 2009. Integral Ecology: 
Using Multiple Perspectives on the Natural World. Boston, MA: Shambhala 
Publications, Inc. See p. 82.
21. Adams, G. 2002. “A Theistic Perspective on Ken Wilber’s Transpersonal 
Psychology.” Journal of Contemporary Religion, 17(2): 165–179. p. 170.
22. Esbjörn-Hargens, Sean & Zimmerman, Michael E. 2009. Integral Ecology: 
Using Multiple Perspectives on the Natural World. Boston, MA: Shambhala 
Publications, Inc. p. 78.
23. Esbjörn-Hargens, Sean & Zimmerman, Michael E. 2009. Integral Ecology: 
Using Multiple Perspectives on the Natural World. Boston, MA: Shambhala 
Publications, Inc. p. 12.
24. Dawkins, Richard. 2004. The Ancestor’s Tale: A Pilgrimage to the Dawn of 
Evolution. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.
25. To this writer’s knowledge of science an accurate perspective: organisms 
are in fact shaping and re-shaping the world in fundamental ways and human 
beings are contributing significantly; so much so that recently a group of 
geologists have suggested we have entered a new and definitely not glorious 
geological epoch known as Anthropcene: humans will have made long-term 
devastating impacts on the non-human world, including being responsible for 
the second largest mass-extinction. See Zalasiewicz, Jan, Williams, Mark, 
187
Steffen, Will, & Paul, Crutzen. 2010. “The New World of the Anthropocene.” 
Environmental Science & Technology, XXX: A–D. Retrieved on March 26, 2010 
from http://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1021/es903118j 
26. Esbjörn-Hargens, Sean & Zimmerman, Michael E. 2009. Integral Ecology: 
Using Multiple Perspectives on the Natural World. Boston, MA: Shambhala 
Publications, Inc. p. 104.
27. Esbjörn-Hargens, Sean & Zimmerman, Michael E. 2009. Integral Ecology: 
Using Multiple Perspectives on the Natural World. Boston, MA: Shambhala 
Publications, Inc. p. 13.
28. Esbjörn-Hargens, Sean & Zimmerman, Michael E. 2009. Integral Ecology: 
Using Multiple Perspectives on the Natural World. Boston, MA: Shambhala 
Publications, Inc. p. 481.
29. Plumwood, Val. 2002. Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of 
Reason. New York: Routledge. Plumwood provides an excellent exploration of 
the relationship between the ecological crisis and modes of political and class 
logic; illustrating how complex the situations facing environmentalists, and the 
broader human race, are to negotiate, Esbjörn-Hargens  and Zimmerman’s 
contribution to this debate as “ecofascist” is reductive and unhelpful.
30. Wilber, Ken. 1989. “Let’s Nuke the Transpersonalists: A Response to Albert 
Ellis.” Journal of Counseling & Development, 67(6): 332–335. p. 333.
188
